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  Abstract	  Since	  the	  failed	  coup	  of	  15	  July	  2016,	  for	  which	  it	  is	  held	  responsible,	  the	  Gülen	  Movement	  (GM)	  has	  been	   in	  crisis.	  With	  no	   foreseeable	   future	   in	   its	  homeland,	  the	  GM	  is	  now	  tasked	  with	  regrouping	  abroad.	  This	  article	  investigates	  the	  GM	  in	  London,	  a	  city	   that,	   for	  various	  reasons,	   is	   likely	   to	  become	  a	  significant	  centre	  for	  Gülenist	  activity	  in	  the	  post-­‐coup	  era.	  Taking	  the	  Dialogue	  Society	  (DS)	  as	  its	  focus,	  it	  investigates	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  GM’s	  survival	  by	  analyzing	  its	  activities,	  both	  before	   and	   after	   the	   coup,	   in	   light	   of	  Mamdani’s1	  discussion	  of	   ‘good’	   and	  ‘bad’	   Muslims	   in	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world.	   The	   article	   shows	   how	   the	   GM	   has	  established	   itself	   as	  a	  voice	  of	   ‘good’	   Islam	   in	   the	  context	  of	  British	  debates	  on	  Islam	   and	   radicalization.	   It	   suggests	   that	   the	   public	   presence	   the	   GM	   has	  established	   for	   itself	   through	   its	   public	   engagement	   activities	   in	   the	   UK	   could	  constitute	   a	   central	   part	   of	   its	   fight	   back	   against	   President	   Erdoğan,	   and	   be	  catalytic	  to	  its	  creation	  of	  a	  dynamic	  future	  in	  exile.	  	  	  	  Keywords:	   failed	   coup,	   Dialogue	   Society,	   public	   relations,	   strategic,	   London,	  ‘good	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  The	  dramatic	  events	  of	  15	  July	  2016	  in	  Turkey	  took	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  world,	  by	   surprise.	  Official	   statistics	   reported	   that	   265	   civilians	  were	  killed	   and	  more	  than	   two	   thousand	   seriously	   injured	   in	   a	   now	   much-­‐discussed	   attempt	   at	   a	  military	  coup.2	  This	  was	  the	  bloodiest	  coup	  attempt	   in	  modern	  Turkish	  history,	  surpassing	  the	  coups	  of	  1960,	  1971	  and	  1980	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  life	  that	  it	  unleashed.	  Despite	  public	  denials	  from	  Fethullah	  Gülen	  and	  the	  skepticism	  of	  some	  Western	  media,3	  there	   is	  now	  ample	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  Gülen	  Movement	  (GM)	  was	  central	  to	  its	  planning	  and	  execution.4	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  “Good	  Muslim,	  Bad	  Muslim:	  A	  Political	  Perspective	  on	  Culture	  and	  Terrorism.”	  American	  Anthropologist	  104,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  766–75.	  2	  Berk	  Esen	  and	  Sebnem	  Gumuscu.	  “Turkey:	  How	  the	  Coup	  Failed.”	  Journal	  of	  
Democracy	  28,	  no.	  1	  (January	  2017):	  59–73.	  See	  also	  Hakan	  M.	  Yavuz	  and	  Bayram	  Balcı,	  eds.	  Turkey’s	  July	  15th	  Coup	  and	  the	  Gülen	  Movement.	  Salt	  Lake	  City:	  University	  of	  Utah	  Press,	  2018.	  3	  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/26/opinion/fethullah-­‐gulen-­‐i-­‐condemn-­‐all-­‐threats-­‐to-­‐turkeys-­‐democracy.html	  (accessed	  31	  January	  2018).	  	  4	  Journalist	  Sedat	  Ergin,	  writing	  for	  Hürriyet	  Daily	  News,	  has	  extensively	  investigated	  and	  reported	  on	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  GM	  having	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  coup	  attempt.	  See	  the	  archive	  of	  his	  work	  in	  English	  at	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  During	  its	  heyday	  in	  the	  2000s	  and	  early	  2010s,	  the	  GM	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  and	   affluent	   religious	   group	   in	   Turkey.	   It	   ran	   a	   lucrative	   global	   network	   of	  schools	   and	   universities,	   financial	   institutions,	   private	   hospitals	   and	   other	  businesses	  with	   a	   total	   net	  worth	   in	   the	   tens	   of	   billions	   of	   dollars.	  During	   this	  time,	   the	   GM	   maintained	   a	   pragmatic	   working	   relationship	   with	   the	   AKP	  government,	  based	  on	  a	   shared	  commitment	   to	   its	   conservative	   socio-­‐religious	  agenda	   as	   well	   as	   an	   eye	   for	   the	   accumulation	   of	  material	   wealth	   and	   power.	  However,	  the	  alliance	  began	  to	  show	  signs	  of	  strain	  during	  the	  AKP’s	  third	  term	  in	   office	   (2011-­‐15).	   After	   an	   incremental	   demise,	   it	   publically	   collapsed	   in	  December	  2013	  when	  the	  GM	  launched	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  then-­‐Prime	  Minister	  Erdoğan,	   attempting	   to	   smear	   him	   and	   his	   close	   allies	   with	   a	   raft	   of	   serious	  corruption	  allegations.	  The	  challenge	  was	  not	  successful:	  although	  damaged,	  the	  prime	  minister	   remained	   in	   office,	   vowing	   thereafter	   to	   punish	   the	   GM	   for	   its	  apparent	   act	   of	   treachery.	   Over	   the	   following	   two	   and	   a	   half	   years,	   senior	  Gülenists	  were	  routinely	  arrested	  in	  Turkey	  and	  in	  May	  2015	  a	  major	  GM	  asset,	  Bank	  Asya,	  became	  the	  first	  of	   the	  movement’s	   institutions	  to	  be	  forcibly	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  state.	  	  	  	  When	   news	   of	   the	   coup	   attempt	   broke	   on	   the	   night	   of	   15	   July	   2016,	   Erdoğan	  immediately	  declared	  Gülen	  to	  be	  its	  mastermind.	  Since	  then,	  the	  GM	  in	  Turkey	  has	  been	  completely	  dismantled,	  and	  its	  considerable	  financial	  assets	  there	  have	  been	  frozen.	   Its	  schools	  –	  estimated	  to	  have	  numbered	  around	  1,000	  –	  have	  all	  been	  closed	  down,	  taken	  into	  state	  control,	  or	  in	  some	  extreme	  case	  vandalized	  by	   angry	   anti-­‐GM	   mobs.	   The	   principal	   mouthpiece	   of	   the	   GM	   in	   Turkey,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/sedat-­‐ergin/.	  See	  also	  Esen	  and	  Gumuscu	  op.	  cit.	  and	  the	  postscript	  to	  Yavuz	  and	  Balcı	  op.	  cit.	  for	  further	  articulation	  of	  the	  case	  against	  the	  GM,	  along	  with	  Ayşe	  Zarakol,	  “The	  Failed	  Coup	  in	  Turkey:	  What	  We	  Know	  so	  Far.”	  PONARS	  Eurasia	  Policy	  Memo,	  no.	  433	  (July	  2016).	  The	  matter	  is,	  nonetheless,	  far	  from	  resolved:	  for	  a	  list	  of	  scholars	  and	  observers	  who	  dispute	  this	  explanation	  of	  events,	  see	  the	  note	  83	  of	  the	  2016	  UK	  Parliamentary	  report	  on	  Fethullah	  Gülen	  and	  the	  Hizmet	  Movement,	  available	  at	  http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-­‐affairs-­‐committee/uks-­‐relations-­‐with-­‐turkey/written/42795.pdf	  (accessed	  1	  February	  2018).	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Journalists’	   and	   Writers’	   Foundation	   (Gazeteciler	   ve	   Yazarlar	   Vakfı,	   GYV)	   was	  immediately	   closed	   down	   after	   the	   coup,	   and	   its	   staff	   have	   been	   either	  imprisoned	   or	   forced	   into	   hiding	   or	   exile.	   The	   major	   media	   outlets	   that	   the	  movement	   ran,	   including	   the	   Zaman	  newspaper	   group,	   have	   been	   shut	   and	   its	  editorial	  staff	  arrested.	  The	  movement	  is	  not	  the	  only	  victim	  of	  the	  government’s	  media	   clampdown,	   or	   indeed	   of	   its	   sweeping	   purge	   of	   state	   employees.	   Over	  135,000	  have	  now	  been	  sacked	  or	  reassigned,	  and	  not	  all	  of	   these	  people	  were	  associated	  (even	  indirectly)	  with	  Gülen.5	  	  	  Alongside	   the	   structural	   dismantling	   of	   the	   GM’s	   activities	   in	   Turkey	   since	   the	  attempted	  coup,	  public	  opinion	  has	  also	  turned	  comprehensively	  against	  Gülen.	  An	  opinion	  poll	   taken	   in	  the	   immediate	  aftermath	  showed	  that	  65%	  of	  Turkish	  citizens	   believed	   him	   to	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   failed	   putsch.6	  Since	   that	   time,	  although	  there	  have	  been	  repeated	  criticisms	  of	  the	  government’s	  heavy	  handed	  crackdown	  (namely	  from	  the	  opposition	  CHP),	  there	  have	  been	  no	  serious	  public	  defenses	  of	  Gülen	  within	  Turkey.	  This	  situation	  marks	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  the	  2000s	  and	  early	  2010s,	  when	  the	  GM	  commanded	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  domestic	   support.	   Many	   groups,	   including	   leftists	   and	   liberal	   intelligentsia,	  endorsed	  the	  GM	  while	  it	  was	  allied	  with	  the	  government	  in	  the	  first	  two	  terms	  of	   the	   AKP’s	   tenure.	   During	   this	   time,	   the	   AKP	   was	   widely	   applauded	   for	   its	  stated	   intentions	   to	   loosen	  some	  of	   the	   constraints	  of	   strict	  Kemalism	   in	  order	  (ostensibly)	  to	  fully	  consolidate	  the	  democratic	  process,	  and	  also	  to	  stabilize	  and	  develop	   the	   Turkish	   economy.	   In	   the	   same	   vein,	   government	   supporters	   and	  secularists	   alike	   applauded	   the	   GM	   for	   its	   modernizing,	   pro-­‐western	   stance,	  including	   its	   contributions	   to	   education	   and	   its	   upwardly	   mobile	   approach	   to	  industry	  and	  entrepreneurship.	  	  	  The	   tide	   of	   public	   opinion	   began	   to	   turn	   against	   the	   GM	   at	   approximately	   the	  same	   time	   that	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   AKP	   publically	   deteriorated.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Schenkkan	  quotes	  Turkish	  human	  rights	  monitoring	  group	  iHop	  as	  stating	  that	  31%	  of	  those	  detained	  in	  the	  purges	  to	  date	  were	  associated	  with	  Kurdish	  or	  leftist	  groups.	  Nate	  Schenkkan,	  “The	  Remarkable	  Scale	  of	  Turkey’s	  ‘Global	  Purge.’”	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  January	  29,	  2018.	  6	  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/magazine/inside-­‐turkeys-­‐purge.html	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corruption	  allegations	   that	  Gülenist	  prosecutors	   launched	  against	  Erdoğan	  and	  his	  close	  allies	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013	  relied	  entirely	  upon	  the	  illegal	  wire-­‐tapping	  of	  private	   telephone	   conversations,	   and	   while	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   conversations	  were	   scandalous,	   there	  was	  no	  doubt	   they	  had	  been	  obtained	   through	  entirely	  illicit	   means.	   The	   movement	   had	   taken	   a	   gamble,	   assuming	   that	   the	   material	  would	  be	  shocking	  enough	  to	  seriously	  weaken	  the	  president’s	  position,	  and	  that	  an	   indignant	   public	   would	   overlook	   the	   illegality	   of	   its	   sources.	   The	   gamble	  backfired:	   the	   president	   remained	   in	   position,	   and	   the	   GM	   itself	   hemorrhaged	  vital	  credibility.	  	  	  The	  movement	  lost	  further	  support	  because	  of	  the	  controversial	  role	  it	  played	  in	  the	   Balyoz	   and	   Ergenekon	   trials,	   which	   culminated	   in	   2012	   and	   2013	  respectively.	  At	  their	  conclusion,	  hundreds	  of	  military	  officers	  and	  journalists	  as	  well	   as	   politicians	   and	   academics	   were	   found	   guilty	   of	   plotting	   to	   violently	  overthrow	   the	  democratic	   order,	   and	   sentenced	   to	   length	   spells	   in	  prison.	  The	  evidence	   used	   against	   them	  was	   later	   found	   to	   have	   been	   fabricated,	   and	   the	  sentences	   of	   those	   convicted	   were	   overturned	   pending	   retrials.	   The	   Gülenists	  within	   the	   judiciary	   who	   had	   prosecuted	   the	   cases	   were	   widely	   condemned,	  accused	  of	  having	  acted	  nefariously	  in	  order	  to	  purge	  the	  secular	  establishment	  of	  their	  own	  rivals	  and	  enemies.7	  By	  the	  time	  the	  coup	  attempt	  was	  launched	  on	  15	   July	   2016,	   it	  was	   therefore	   commonly	   known	   that	   the	   GM	   had	   a	   history	   of	  abusing	   power	   in	   its	   homeland	   and	   engaging	   in	   illegal	   and	   anti-­‐democratic	  activities,8	  and	   this	   largely	   accounts	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   independent	   voices	   in	  Turkey	  seeking	  to	  defend	  Gülen	  and	  his	  followers	  today.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Osman	  Can,	  ‘The	  Structural	  Causes	  of	  Political	  Crisis	  in	  Turkey’,	  Insight	  Turkey	  16,	  no	  2	  (2014):	  33-­‐41.	  	  	  8	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  GM	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  significant	  contributor	  to	  the	  backsliding	  of	  democracy	  in	  Turkey	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  Turkish	  politics	  along	  authoritarian	  lines.	  See	  Esen	  and	  Gumuscu,	  op.cit.	  See	  also	  Ergun	  Özbudun,	  “AKP	  at	  the	  Crossroads:	  Erdoğan’s	  Majoritarian	  Drift.”	  South	  European	  Society	  
and	  Politics	  19,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  155–67,	  and	  Murat	  Somer,	  “Understanding	  Turkey’s	  Democratic	  Breakdown:	  Old	  vs.	  New	  and	  Indigenous	  vs.	  Global	  Authoritarianism.”	  Southeast	  European	  and	  Black	  Sea	  Studies	  16,	  no.	  4	  (2016):	  481–503.	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THE	  GM	  IN	  EXILE	  SINCE	  THE	  COUP	  Since	   15	   July,	   significant	   numbers	   of	   GM	   affiliates	   (as	   well	   as	   opposition	  supporters	   and	  many	  others	   fleeing	   the	  purges)	  have	   left	  Turkey	   and	   are	  now	  living	  in	  international	  exile.	  The	  period	  since	  the	  coup	  has	  seen	  the	  movement	  in	  crisis,	   seeking	   to	  defend	   itself	  against	   the	  allegations	  of	  criminal	  activity	   that	   it	  faces	  in	  Turkey,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  stem	  the	  flow	  of	  material	  losses	  that	  it	  has	  incurred	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.9	  Although	  the	  GM	  has	  been	  fully	  globalized	  since	  the	  very	  early	  2000s,	  its	  activities	  and	  the	  organization	  and	  movement	  of	  its	  people	  have	  always	  revolved	  closely	  around	   its	  Turkish	  homeland.	  With	  access	   to	   that	  homeland	  cut	  off,	   in	  order	  to	  have	  any	  kind	  of	  future,	  the	  GM	  needs	  to	  recreate	  itself	  as	  a	  global	  diaspora	  movement	  operating	  entirely	  in	  international	  space.	  	  	  Since	  Gülen’s	  move	   to	   the	  USA	   in	   1999,	   his	   followers	   have	   invested	   heavily	   in	  public	   relations	   activities,	   and	   have	   focused	   on	   promoting	   Gülen’s	   interests	   to	  strategic	   global	   audiences.	   Two	   major	   Gülenist	   organizations	   in	   Western	  countries	  were	  established	  in	  1999:	  the	  Rumi	  Forum	  in	  Washington	  DC,	  and	  the	  Dialogue	   Society	   in	   London.	   These	   organizations	   have	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	  Gülenist	   PR	   over	   nearly	   two	   decades,	   and	   have	   secured	   for	   the	   movement	   a	  carefully	  constructed	  audience	  of	  influential	  supporters	  and	  sympathizers	  in	  two	  key	  western	  capital	  cities.	  Unlike	  at	  home	  in	  Turkey,	  where	  support	  for	  the	  GM	  has	  evaporated	  over	  recent	  years,	  the	  support	  of	  this	  international	  group	  of	  GM	  sympathizers	   appears	   to	   still	   be	   largely	   intact.10	  It	   is	   possible	   that,	   as	   the	   GM	  negotiates	  a	  new	  global	  future	  for	  itself	  in	  the	  face	  of	  fierce	  hostility	  from	  Turkey,	  the	  endorsement	  of	  this	  international	  support	  base	  will	  prove	  significant.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   what	   follows,	   I	   analyze	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   Dialogue	   Society	   in	   London	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  Gülenist	  PR,	  both	  before	  and	  since	   the	  coup,	  and	  probe	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   appeal	   it	   seems	   to	   hold	   to	   a	   particular	  Western	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  A	  transnational	  witch-­‐hunt	  targeting	  senior	  GM	  affiliates	  is	  currently	  being	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Turkish	  government,	  and	  has	  seen	  arrests	  and	  extraditions	  of	  individuals	  as	  well	  as	  school	  closures	  in	  an	  estimated	  46	  countries.	  See	  Schenkkan,	  op.cit.	  10	  Mark	  Juergensmeyer,	  “Talking	  with	  the	  ‘Religious	  Terrorist’	  That	  Turkey	  Wants	  Trump	  to	  Extradite.”	  Religion	  Dispatches,	  January	  12,	  2017.	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audience.	  In	  deconstructing	  the	  GM’s	  engagement	  with	  strategic	  individuals	  in	  a	  Western	  center	  of	  power,	  I	  seek	  primarily	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  future	  prospects	  of	  the	   GM	   as	   a	   global	   enterprise.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   also	   interrogate	   the	   securitized	  narratives	   surrounding	   Islam	   that	   continue	   to	   dominate	   the	   post-­‐9/11	   world,	  which	  have	  undoubtedly	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  GM	  is	  received	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  Western	  countries.	  	  The	  movement’s	  British	  branch	  has	  been,	  to	  date,	  considerably	  smaller	  than	  its	  counterpart	   in	   either	   the	   USA,	   where	   Gülen	   himself	   is	   located,	   or	   indeed	  Germany,	   where	   there	   are	   higher	   numbers	   of	   migrants	   from	   Turkey.11	  The	  British	  GM	  is,	  however,	   likely	  to	  become	  increasingly	  significant	  as	  a	  center	   for	  the	  movement	  in	  exile.	  With	  Gülen’s	  extradition	  case	  becoming	  a	  serious	  sticking	  point	   in	   Turkish-­‐US	   relations,	   the	   USA	   –	   previously	   the	   GM’s	   major	   center	  outside	  Turkey	  -­‐	  is	  less	  attractive	  to	  GM	  affiliates	  than	  it	  was	  previously.	  The	  UK	  capital	   could	   offer	   a	   strategic	   alternative.	   In	   April	   2017	   the	   Home	   Office	  publically	  announced	   that,	   in	   light	  of	   the	  purges	  underway	   in	  Turkey,	  personal	  association	  with	  Gülen	  could	  be	  sufficient	  grounds	  for	  Turkish	  citizens	  to	  apply	  for	  asylum.12	  With	  a	  number	  of	  senior	  Gülenists	  already	  resident	  in	  Britain,	  it	  is	  feasible	  that	  London,	  a	  global,	  multi-­‐cultural	  city	  where	  Turkish	  communities	  are	  generally	  well	  integrated	  and	  accepted,	  might	  become	  a	  new	  focus	  of	  GM	  activity	  in	  exile.	  	  	  	  
AFTER	  9/11	  AND	  7/7	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  KINGDOM	  The	  following	  analysis	  of	  the	  GM	  and	  its	  international	  presence	  needs	  to	  start	  by	  recognizing	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  that	  took	  place	  viz-­‐a-­‐viz	  Islam	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	   the	   West	   on	   11	   September	   2001.	   Since	   that	   time,	   cultural	   and	   political	  climates	  in	  Western	  nations	  have	  been	  colored	  by	  anxieties	  about	  radical	  Islam	  and	  in	  the	  UK,	  these	  concerns	  increased	  after	  further	  al-­‐Qaeda	  terror	  attacks	  in	  central	  London	  on	  7	  July	  2005.	  In	  response	  to	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  attacks,	  Samuel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  There	  are	  approximately	  250,000	  people	  of	  Turkish/Turkish-­‐Kurdish	  origin	  living	  in	  the	  UK,	  while	  in	  Germany	  there	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  at	  least	  4	  million.	  12	  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/607266/CPIN_-­‐_Turkey_-­‐_Gulenists_-­‐_v1.pdf	  (accessed	  31	  January	  2018).	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Huntingdon’s	   ‘clash	  of	  civilizations’	   thesis	  has	  been	  widely	   invoked,	  offering	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  tragedy	  that	  posited	  Islam	  as	  the	  perennial	  enemy	  of	  Western	  societies.13	  This	  narrative,	  which	  has	  been	  debunked,14	  presents	  Islam	  as	  a	  static	  and	  essential	  category,	  unaffected	  by	  time,	   location	  or	  circumstance.	  As	  such,	   it	  continues	   the	   reductionist	   stereotypes	   of	   Islamic	   societies	   that	   Edward	   Said	  identified	   in	   Orientalism. 15 	  In	   designating	   Islam	   as	   uniformly	   ‘pre-­‐modern’,	  proponents	   of	   the	   clash	   of	   civilizations	   thesis	   see	   Muslims	   neither	   as	   co-­‐participants	   in	   the	   modern	   world,	   nor	   as	   independent	   social,	   cultural	   and	  political	  agents.	  	  	  Derivative	  explanations	  have	  looked	  beyond	  a	  clash	  between	  Islam	  and	  the	  West	  and	   posited	   a	   schism	   within	   Islam	   itself,	   drawing	   a	   distinction	   between	   a	  minority	  of	  rogue	  extremists	  who	  exist	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  the	  ‘true’	  Muslim	  mainstream.	  Mahmood	  Mamdani	  observed	  this	  in	  a	  seminal	  article	  of	  2002:	  	   Certainly,	  we	  are	  now	  told	  to	  distinguish	  between	  good	  Muslims	  and	  bad	  Muslims.	  […]	  We	  are	  told	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fault	  line	  running	  through	  Islam,	   a	   line	   that	   separates	   moderate	   Islam,	   called	   ‘genuine	   Islam’,	  from	  extremist	  political	  Islam.	  The	  terrorists	  of	  September	  11,	  we	  are	  told,	   did	   not	   just	   hijack	   planes,	   they	   also	   hijacked	   Islam,	   meaning	  ‘genuine’	  Islam.16	  	  ‘Good’	  and	  ‘genuine’	  Muslims	  are	  those	  who	  live	  peaceably	  and	  according	  to	  the	  law,	  and	  who	  integrate	  within	  secular	  western	  nations.	   ‘Bad	  Muslims’	  are	  those	  who	   reject	   the	   pluralistic	   values	   of	   those	   nations	   and	   commit	   acts	   of	   violence	  against	   them.	  These	   binary	   categories	  were	   in	   fact	   established	   long	   before	   the	  current	   ‘War	   on	   Terror’.	   They	  were	   present	   during	   colonial	   encounters	   in	   the	  19th	   and	   early	   20th	   centuries,	   where	  Muslims	  who	   cooperated	  with	   colonizing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntingdon,	  “The	  Clash	  of	  Civilizations?”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  72,	  no.	  3	  (1993):	  22–49.	  14	  Hasan	  Azad,	  “Do	  Muslims	  Belong	  in	  the	  West?	  An	  Interview	  with	  Talal	  Asad.”	  
Jadaliyya,	  February	  3,	  2015.	  See	  also	  Olivier	  Roy,	  Globalized	  Islam:	  The	  Search	  for	  
a	  New	  Ummah.	  Hurst	  and	  Company,	  2004.	  	  15	  Said,	  Edward	  W.	  Orientalism.	  New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1978.	  	  16	  Mamdani,	  op.	  cit.,	  p.767-­‐8.	  A	  fuller	  application	  of	  Mamdani’s	  work	  to	  the	  GM	  case	  is	  given	  by	  Hendrick	  in	  Yavuz	  and	  Balcı,	  op.cit.	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powers	  were	   legitimised	  and	  accepted,	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  were	  denigrated	  as	  dangerous	  and	  subversive.17	  	  In	  Britain,	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  narrative	  in	  the	  21st	  century	  context	  could	  be	   clearly	   seen	   in	   the	   response	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Tony	   Blair	   to	   the	   al-­‐Qaeda	  inspired	   terrorist	   attacks	   carried	   out	   in	   central	   London	   on	   7	   July	   2005.	   The	  attacks	   of	   7/7,	   as	   they	   became	   known,	   were	   the	   first	   coordinated	   jihadi	  offensives	   in	   the	   UK	   and,	   significantly,	   they	   were	   not	   executed	   by	   foreign	  nationals	   but	   by	   British-­‐born	   attackers.	   In	   his	   speech	   to	   Parliament	   four	   days	  later,	  Blair	  addressed	  the	  British	  Muslim	  community	  directly,	  saying:	  	   We	  were	  proud	  of	  your	  contribution	  to	  Britain	  before	  last	  Thursday.	  We	  remain	  proud	  of	  it	  today.	  Fanaticism	  is	  not	  a	  state	  of	  religion	  but	  a	  state	  of	  mind.	  We	  will	  work	  with	  you	  to	  make	  the	  moderate	  and	  true	  voice	  of	  Islam	  heard	  as	  it	  should	  be.18	  	  These	   attempts	   by	   a	   non-­‐Muslim,	   British	   politician,	   and	   many	   others	   besides	  him,	  to	  define	  what	  constitutes	  the	  ‘true	  voice	  of	  Islam’	  have	  unsurprisingly	  been	  met	  with	   scepticism	   by	  many	  within	   the	  Muslim	   community.	   Notwithstanding	  the	  immediate	  problems	  that	  arise	  from	  using	  the	  term	  ‘moderate’	  (namely,	  the	  offensive	  implication	  that	  ‘moderate’	  Muslims	  are	  less	  religiously	  observant	  than	  ‘full’	  Muslims),	  there	  are	  considerable	  ontological	  challenges	  inherent	  in	  making	  declarations	  of	  theological	  normativity	  in	  Islam	  from	  an	  outsider	  perspective.	  	  At	  the	   time	   of	   the	   7/7	   attacks,	   Britain’s	   largest	   Muslim	   organization,	   the	  Muslim	  Council	  of	  Britain	  (MCB)	  stood	  with	  the	  government,	  but	  in	  the	  intervening	  years	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  has	  become	  strained.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Jonathan	  Reynolds,	  “Good	  and	  Bad	  Muslims:	  Islam	  and	  Indirect	  Rule	  in	  Northern	  Nigeria.”	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  African	  Historical	  Studies	  34,	  no.	  3	  (2001):	  601–18.	  18	  Tony	  Blair’s	  Statement	  to	  MPs,	  Monday	  11	  July	  2005:	  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/jul/11/uksecurity.terrorism	  (accessed	  31	  October	  2017).	  19	  See	  ‘No	  one	  to	  talk	  to:	  a	  Muslim	  group	  falls	  from	  favour’	  in	  The	  Economist,	  18	  October	  2014.	  See	  also	  Sarfraz	  Mansoor,	  ‘Can	  we	  drop	  the	  term	  ‘moderate	  Muslim’?	  It’s	  meaningless’	  in	  The	  Guardian,	  16	  March	  2015.	  Different	  dimensions	  of	  the	  ‘moderate	  Muslim’	  paradigm,	  and	  the	  responses	  of	  British	  Muslim	  communities	  to	  it,	  are	  discussed	  by:	  Jonathan	  Birt,	  “Good	  Imam,	  Bad	  Imam:	  Civic	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  Nonetheless,	   public	   narratives	   surrounding	   Islam	   in	   the	   UK	   have	   continued	   to	  support	  this	  false	  dichotomy,	  and	  they	  retain	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  political	  traction.	  A	  clear	  example	  is	  Quilliam,	  a	  London-­‐based	  think	  tank	  that	  was	  launched	  in	  2008	  and	   supported	   at	   the	   time	  by	   central	   government	   funds.	  Quilliam	   claims	   to	   be	  ‘the	   world’s	   first	   counter-­‐extremism	   organization’	   and	   aspires	   to	   empower	  ‘moderate’	   Muslim	   voices.	   Its	   three	   founders,	   Maajid	   Nawaaz,	   Ed	   Husain	   and	  Rashad	  Ali,	  are	  all	  previous	  members	  of	  the	  violent	  political	  Islamic	  group	  Hizb	  ut-­‐Tahrir,	  and	  now	  advocates	  for	  peace.	  Quilliam	  serves	  an	  important	  purpose	  in	  the	  British	  government’s	  endeavor	   to	  combat	   radicalization,	  providing	  a	  public	  counter-­‐narrative	   from	   ex-­‐extremists	   themselves.	   It	   navigates	   a	   difficult	   path	  between	  the	  establishment	  and	  British	  Muslim	  communities,	   from	  whom	  it	  has	  attracted	   sustained	   criticism.20	  What	   Quilliam	   demonstrates,	   and	   the	   reason	   I	  involve	   it	   here,	   is	   that	   there	   is	   clearly	   an	   appetite	   within	   the	   British	  establishment	   for	   public	   representations	   of	   Islam	   that	   embrace	   liberal	  democratic	   values,	   and	   support	   the	   binary	   dichotomization	   of	   Muslims	   into	  ‘moderates’	  and	  ‘extremists’.	  It	  is	  this	  same	  appetite	  that	  the	  GM	  has	  also	  fed	  in	  recent	  years,	  in	  ways	  that	  I	  will	  now	  address.	  	  
	  
THE	  GÜLEN	  MOVEMENT	  IN	  THE	  UNITED	  KINGDOM:	  THE	  DIALOGUE	  SOCIETY	  The	  GM	  has	   been	   present	   in	   the	  UK	   since	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   and,	   as	   is	   typical,	   its	  activities	   there	   are	   dominated	   by	   education	   and	   intercultural	   dialogue.21	  With	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Religion	  and	  National	  Integration	  in	  Britain	  Post-­‐9/11.”	  The	  Muslim	  World	  96,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  687–705;	  Katherine	  Brown,	  “The	  Promise	  and	  Perils	  of	  Women’s	  Participation	  in	  UK	  Mosques:	  The	  Impact	  of	  Securitisation	  Agendas	  on	  Identity,	  Gender	  and	  Community.”	  The	  British	  Journal	  of	  Politics	  and	  International	  
Relations	  10,	  no.	  3	  (2008):	  472–91;	  Sean	  McLoughlin,	  “The	  State,	  ‘New’	  Muslim	  Leaderships	  and	  Islam	  as	  a	  ‘Resource’	  for	  Engagement	  in	  Britain.”	  In	  European	  
Muslims	  and	  the	  Secular	  State,	  edited	  by	  Jocelyne	  Cesari	  and	  Sean	  McLoughlin.	  Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  2005:	  55-­‐69.	  20	  Sayeeda	  Warsi,	  The	  Enemy	  Within:	  A	  Tale	  of	  Muslim	  Britain.	  London:	  Penguin	  UK,	  2017.	  21	  There	  is,	  to	  date,	  no	  critical	  scholarship	  on	  the	  GM	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  A	  2014	  study	  produced	  by	  Sanaa	  El-­‐Banna	  was	  published	  by	  a	  GM	  publishing	  house,	  Blue	  Dome	  Press,	  and	  therefore	  lacks	  critical	  distance	  from	  its	  subject.	  A	  2015	  chapter	  by	  Paul	  Weller	  on	  the	  movement	  in	  the	  UK	  provides	  a	  useful	  overview	  of	  the	  movement’s	  activities	  but	  is	  also	  positioned	  in	  favour	  of	  Gülen	  in	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respect	  to	  public	  relations,	  the	  most	  significant	  organization	  that	  the	  GM	  runs	  in	  the	   UK	   is	   the	   Dialogue	   Society	   (DS).	   The	   DS	   has	   representatives	   across	   the	  country,	  although	  its	  main	  activities	  take	  place	  in	  the	  capital.	  It	  was	  established	  in	   1999,	   the	   same	   year	   that	   Gülen	   fled	   Turkey	   for	   the	   USA	   and	   his	   followers	  established	   their	   other	  major	   international	   public	   relations	  platform,	   the	  Rumi	  Forum	   in	   Washington	   D.C.	   As	   such,	   serendipitous	   timing	   has	   allowed	   the	  movement	  to	  capitalize	  on	  a	  pivotal	  moment	  in	  the	  political	  history	  of	  the	  West	  and	   its	  relations	  with	  Muslims:	   in	   the	  early	  post-­‐2001	  era,	   the	  GM	  was	  already	  well	   established	   and	   effectively	   positioned	   to	   engage	   strategic	   audiences	   on	  debates	  surrounding	  Islam	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  West.	  Gülen	  could	  not,	  of	  course,	  have	  foreseen	  the	  dramatic	  turn	  of	  events	  that	  would	  occur	  in	  2001,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  that,	  as	  of	  two	  years	  previously,	  he	  and	  his	  followers	  were	  already	  taking	   steps	   to	   increase	   their	   investment	   in	  public	   relations	   in	  Western	  capital	  cities.	  	  	  	  	  The	   term	   ‘dialogue’	   in	   the	   GM	   context	   has	   been	   discussed	   elsewhere	   in	   the	  literature,22	  and	   it	   is	   not	   my	   intention	   to	   analyse	   its	   meaning	   and	   application	  again	  here.	  Suffice	  to	  say,	  the	  focus	  of	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  DS	  is	  not	  inter-­‐faith	  debate.	   Although	   its	   activities	   and	   publications	   are	   inflected	   with	   a	   greater	  interest	  in	  Islam	  than	  in	  other	  religions,	  the	  general	  tenor	  of	  the	  DS	  in	  its	  public	  activities	   is	   not	   openly	   religious.23	  	   Rather,	   it	   addresses	   questions	   to	   do	   with	  pluralism	   and	   peaceful	   coexistence	   in	   mostly	   secular	   language,	   and	   claims	   to	  stand	   for	   ‘democracy,	   human	   rights,	   the	   non-­‐instrumentalization	   of	   religion	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  its	  analysis.	  See	  Gürkhan	  Çelik,	  Johan	  Leman,	  and	  Karel	  Steenbrink,	  eds.	  Gülen-­‐
Inspired	  Hizmet	  in	  Europe:	  The	  Western	  Journey	  of	  a	  Turkish	  Muslim	  Movement.	  Brussels:	  Peter	  Lang,	  2015.	  22	  Caroline	  Tee,	  The	  Gülen	  Movement	  in	  Turkey:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Islam	  and	  
Modernity.	  London:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2016;	  Hakan	  M.	  Yavuz,	  Toward	  an	  Islamic	  
Enlightenment:	  The	  Gülen	  Movement.	  Oxford	  and	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2013.	  	  23	  It	  is	  likely,	  however,	  that	  the	  internal	  activities	  of	  the	  DS	  are	  heavily	  inflected	  by	  Islam.	  I	  have	  not	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  carry	  out	  sustained	  participant	  observation	  within	  the	  DS,	  but	  on	  visiting	  its	  (now	  closed)	  offices	  in	  north	  London	  in	  2014,	  I	  noticed	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  large,	  dedicated	  prayer	  room	  stocked	  with	  an	  array	  of	  religious	  texts.	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politics,	   equality	   and	   freedom	   of	   speech’.24	  To	   these	   ends,	   the	   DS	   is	   active	   in	  academic	  research	  and	  advocacy,	  and	  publishes	  peer-­‐reviewed	  articles	  in	  an	  in-­‐house	  journal,	  Journal	  of	  Dialogue	  Studies.	  	  	  The	   DS	   serves	   as	   a	   hub	   for	   the	   targeted	   promotion	   of	   Gülen	   and	   the	   GM	   to	   a	  specific	  strategic	  audience	  in	  London.	  This	  audience	  is	  comprised	  of	  politicians,	  academics,	   (non-­‐Muslim)	   faith	   leaders	  and	   local	  dignitaries,	   and	   it	   is	   invited	   to	  consume	  a	  very	  particular	  narrative	  about	  the	  GM	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  ways.	  In	   the	   analysis	   that	   follows,	   I	   focus	   on	   two	   major	   public	   events	   that	   the	   DS	  organised	  in	  London	  between	  2007	  and	  2014.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  invited	  audience	  included	   high	   profile	   individuals,	   and	   the	   event	   took	   place	   in	   a	   prestigious	  location	  inscribed	  with	  cultural	  and/or	  political	  significance.	  	  	  	  Social	  scientists	  studying	  the	  urban	  landscape	  have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   human	   beings	  make	   “use	   of	   the	  material	  world	   for	   political	   effect”.25	  This	  observation	  often	  describes	  architectural	  strategies	  employed	  by	  particular	  political	  regimes,	  whereby	  specific	  buildings	  and	  material	  sites	  are	  constructed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  reflects	  a	  dominant	  national	  ideology.	  Differently	  from	  this,	  I	  want	  to	   draw	   attention	   here	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   GM	   as	   a	   transnational	  organisation	   has	   appropriated	   existing	   symbolic	   geographies	   in	   a	   foreign	  country.	   It	   has	   done	   this	   in	   parallel	   with	   the	   recruitment	   of	   influential	  sympathisers	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  has	  capitalized	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  ‘deflected	  legitimacy’	  that	  has	   furthered	   its	  cause	  amongst	  observers.	  As	  such,	   the	  GM	  in	  London	  has	  utilized	   the	  potency	  of	  specific	  material	   spaces	   that	  are	   inscribed	  with	  political	  and/or	   cultural	   significance	   as	   a	   powerful	   aid	   to	   the	   transmission	  of	   its	   public	  relations	  message.	  	  	  
LONDON	  CONFERENCE:	  MUSLIM	  WORLD	  IN	  TRANSITION	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  http://www.dialoguesociety.org/about-­‐us.html	  (accessed	  1	  November	  2017).	  25	  Chandra	  Mukerji,	  “The	  Territorial	  State	  as	  a	  Figured	  World	  of	  Power:	  Strategics,	  Logistics,	  and	  Impersonal	  Rule.”	  Sociological	  Theory	  28	  (2010):	  402–24.	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In	  the	  2000s,	  the	  GM	  facilitated	  numerous	  conferences	  in	  Western	  countries	  that	  purported	  to	  study	  the	  movement	  itself,	  and	  which	  were	  often	  hosted	  by	  major	  universities.	   Full	   funding	   was	   usually	   freely	   available	   to	   contributors,	   and	   the	  events	   were	   generally	   more	   lavish	   than	   the	   average	   academic	   meeting.26	  The	  significant	  financial	  investment	  that	  the	  GM	  made	  in	  these	  events	  is	  indicative	  of	  its	   interest	   in	   securing	   the	   endorsement	   (implicit,	   through	   attendance,	   or	  explicit,	   through	   later	   pro-­‐Gülen	   publications)	   of	   the	   invited,	   and	   subsidized,	  academics.	   The	   meetings	   yielded	   edited	   collections	   of	   conference	   proceedings	  that	   were	   then	   distributed	   through	   academic	   networks,	   and	   they	   formed	   the	  bedrock	   of	   a	   burgeoning	   literature	   on	   the	   GM	   that	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	  insider	   perspectives.27	  Contributors	   to	   this	   literature	   generally	   fell	   into	   two	  categories:	   (1)	  Turkish	   academics	  who	  were	   affiliated	  with	   the	  movement;	   (2)	  Western	   academics	  who	  were	  well	   regarded	   in	   their	   own	   fields,	   but	  who	   very	  often	  had	   little	   specialist	   knowledge	  of	  Turkey	  or	   the	   complexities	   of	   the	  GM’s	  stature	   in	   its	  homeland.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  GM	  has	  overseen	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  body	   of	   literature	   that	   ostensibly	   provides	   legitimate	   scholarly	   analysis	   of	   its	  aims	   and	   objectives,	   but	   which	   in	   fact	   has	   been	   heavily	   biased	   towards	   the	  movement.28	  	  	  	  	  In	  October	  2007,	  the	  DS	  organized	  a	  large	  conference	  in	  London,	  the	  objectives	  of	  which	  it	  summarized	  in	  retrospect	  as	  follows:	  	   The	  underlying	  aim	  of	   the	   conference	  was	   to	  examine	   the	   impact	  of	  the	  Gülen	  movement	  on	  the	  contemporary	  Muslim	  world	  in	  transition	  and	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Islam	  in	  general.	  The	  Gülen	  movement	   aims	   to	  promote	   creative	   and	  positive	   relations	  between	  the	  West	  and	  the	  Muslim	  world	  and	  articulate	  a	  constructive	  position	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  Joshua	  Hendrick’s	  introduction	  in	  Gülen,	  in	  which	  he	  describes	  his	  first	  encounter	  with	  the	  movement	  at	  such	  a	  conference.	  	  27	  David	  Tittensor,	  “Secrecy	  and	  Hierarchy	  within	  the	  Gülen	  Movement	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Academic	  Responsibility.”	  In	  Yavuz	  and	  Balcı,	  op.	  cit.	  28	  Examples	  include:	  Tamer	  Balcı	  and	  Christopher	  L.	  Miller,	  eds.	  The	  Gülen	  
Hizmet	  Movement:	  Circumspect	  Activism	  in	  Faith-­‐Based	  Reform.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  Scholars,	  2012.	  See	  also,Greg	  Barton,	  Paul	  Weller,	  and	  İhsan	  Yılmaz,	  eds.	  The	  Muslim	  World	  and	  Politics	  in	  Transition:	  Creative	  Contributions	  of	  the	  
Gülen	  Movement.	  London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academic,	  2013.	  
	   13	  
on	   issues	   such	   as	   democracy,	   multiculturalism,	   globalisation,	   and	  interfaith	  dialogue	  in	  the	  context	  of	  secular	  modernity.29	  	  The	  conference	  was	  launched	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  in	  Westminster,	  the	  center	  of	  British	  political	  life	  and,	  as	  the	  oldest	  seat	  of	  democratic	  governance	  in	  the	  world,	  a	  highly	  symbolic	  location.	  By	  publicly	  expressing	  its	  commitment	  to	  democracy	  and	   multiculturalism	   in	   this	   strategic	   geographical	   space,	   the	   GM’s	   message	  acquired	  considerable	  heft	  and	  gained	  valuable	  PR	  leverage.	  	  	  	  The	   launch	   event	  was	   hosted	   by	   Lord	   (Nazir)	   Ahmed,	  who	  was,	   at	   the	   time,	   a	  high-­‐profile	   peer	   and	   member	   of	   the	   Labour	   Party,30	  and	   it	   was	   attended	   by	  numerous	   other	   politicians	   and	   public	   figures	   including	   Jack	   Straw,	   former	  Foreign	   Secretary	   and	   Bill	   Rammel,	   Minister	   of	   State	   for	   Education	   and	   Skills.	  The	  conference	  was	  held	  at	  two	  major	  London	  universities,	  SOAS	  (University	  of	  London)	  and	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  (LSE).	  By	  organizing	  the	  event	  in	  these	  distinguished	  institutions,	  and	  hosting	  high	  profile	  guests,	  the	  GM	  achieved	  a	   kind	   of	   ‘legitimacy	   by	   association’.	   British	   political	   grandees	   such	   as	   Lord	  Ahmed	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  well	   informed	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  GM,	  or	  its	  complex	  relationship	  with	  political	  power	  in	  Turkey.	  His	  presence	  at	  a	  public	  promotional	  event	  facilitated	  by	  the	  GM	  did,	  however,	  offer	  public	  approval	  and	  highly	  strategic	  endorsement	  to	  the	  global	  GM	  in	  front	  of	  an	  influential	  audience.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  its	  PR	  strategy,	  and	  one	  that	  manifests	  time	  and	  again	  in	  the	  movement’s	  public	  engagement	  events.	  	  	  	  Papers	   at	   the	   conference	   addressed	  many	   different	   facets	   of	   the	   GM,	   although	  none	   of	   them	   applied	   a	   critical	   or	   self-­‐reflexive	   analysis	   of	   the	   movement’s	  evident	  accrual	  of	  both	  political	  and	  material	  power.	  Instead,	  topics	  included	  the	  GM’s	  transnational	  nature,	   its	  rationale	  for	  economic	  enterprise,	   its	  educational	  philosophy,	   and	   Gülen’s	   teachings	   on	   non-­‐violence,	   humanitarianism	   and	   civic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  http://www.dialoguesociety.org/discussion-­‐forums/63-­‐muslim-­‐world-­‐in-­‐transition-­‐contributions-­‐of-­‐the-­‐guelen-­‐movement.html#.WfngFK2cZTY	  (accessed	  1	  November	  2017).	  30	  Lord	  Ahmed	  has	  since	  been	  suspended	  from	  the	  Labour	  Party	  for	  reasons	  unconnected	  to	  the	  present	  discussion.	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participation.31	  There	  were	  also	  various	  attempts	  to	  analyse	  Gülen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Sufi	  tradition	  on	  which	  he	  draws	  in	  many	  of	  his	  writings.	  For	  example,	  Y.	  Alp	  Aslandoğan,	  who	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  members	  of	  Gülen’s	  inner	  circle,	  gave	  a	  paper	  entitled	  ‘Present	  and	  Potential	  Impact	  of	  the	  Spiritual	  Tradition	  of	  Islam	  on	  Contemporary	  Muslims:	  From	  Ghazali	  to	  Gülen’,	  in	  which	  he	  set	  out	  to	  ‘present	  an	  analysis	  of	  [the]	  'balanced'	  spiritual	  tradition	  in	  Islam,	  from	  Ghazali,	  through	  Rumi,	  to	  Gülen.’32	  	  	  There	   is	   evident	   hyperbole	   in	   equating	   Gülen	   to	   these	   giants	   of	   the	   Islamic	  intellectual	   tradition.	   While	   not	   all	   papers	   at	   the	   conference	   engaged	   in	   such	  excessive	   adulation,	   nonetheless,	   they	   all	   adopted	   a	   broadly	   sympathetic	  perspective	   on	   the	   GM	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   they	   gave	   the	  movement	   their	   implicit	  endorsement.	  I	  make	  this	  observation	  not	  to	  cast	  aspersions	  on	  the	  international	  scholars	   who	   participated	   in	   the	   2007	   conference,	   some	   of	   whom	   have	   since	  expressed	  regret	  at	  being	  included.	  Rather,	  I	  use	  it	  to	  illustrate	  the	  climate	  within	  which	  the	  GM	  was	  working	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  2007,	  only	  two	  years	  after	  the	  attacks	  of	  7/7.	   In	   that	   climate,	   as	   in	  many	  ways	   today,	   parts	   of	   the	  British	   establishment	  and	  society	  at	  large	  were	  extremely	  amenable	  to	  hearing	  the	  message	  of	  Muslim	  liberalism,	   pacifism	   and	   progress	   that	   is	   attributed	   to	   Gülen.	   Through	   events	  such	  as	  the	  2007	  London	  conference,	   the	  movement	  successfully	  capitalised	  on	  this	  opportunity.	  	  	  	  
FILM	  PREMIERE:	  LOVE	  IS	  A	  VERB	  A	   similar	   example	  of	  Gülenist	  PR	   took	  place	   in	  November	  2014.	  This	   time,	   the	  focus	   was	   a	   lavish	   premiere	   for	   a	   documentary	   film	   that	   the	   movement	   had	  produced,	  entitled	  Love	  is	  a	  Verb.	  This	  film	  appeared	  within	  a	  year	  of	  the	  public	  degeneration	   of	   relations	   between	   the	   GM	   and	   Turkey’s	   AK	   Party,	   which	   had	  come	   about	  with	   the	  December	   2013	   corruption	   scandals.	   In	   the	  wake	   of	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Contributions	  were	  published	  in	  Louis	  J.	  Cantori,	  Marcia	  K.	  Hermansen,	  and	  David	  B.	  Capes,	  eds.	  Muslim	  World	  in	  Transition:	  Contributions	  of	  the	  Gülen	  
Movement.	  Leeds:	  Leeds	  Metropolitan	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  32	  https://fgulen.com/en/gulen-­‐movement/conference-­‐papers/contributions-­‐of-­‐the-­‐gulen-­‐movement/25903-­‐present-­‐and-­‐potential-­‐impact-­‐of-­‐the-­‐spiritual-­‐tradition-­‐of-­‐islam-­‐on-­‐contemporary-­‐muslims-­‐from-­‐ghazali-­‐to-­‐gulen	  (accessed	  3	  November	  2017).	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episode,	  Erdoğan	  officially	  designated	  the	  movement	  a	  terrorist	  organisation	  and	  began	  the	  task	  of	  dismantling	  its	  assets	  in	  Turkey.33	  The	  release	  of	  Love	  is	  a	  Verb	  therefore	  marked	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	  movement’s	   counter-­‐offensive,	   and	  showed	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  adept	  at	  fighting	  back	  using	  international	  PR	  as	  an	  effective	  weapon.	  	  	  	  The	   premiere	  was	   held	   at	   a	   cinema	   on	   Leicester	   Square	   in	   central	   London,	   an	  iconic	   location	  for	  British	   film	  and	  television,	  and	  the	  most	  prestigious	   location	  for	  such	  a	  screening	  in	  the	  UK.	  Major	  film	  premieres	  are	  often	  held	  in	  Leicester	  Square,	  and	  it	  is	  home	  to	  a	  number	  of	  nationally	  prominent	  cinemas.	  The	  choice	  of	   venue	   is	   further	   indication	   that	   the	   GM	   has	   deployed	   significant	   financial	  resources	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   public	   relations	   successes,	   and	   that	   –	   as	   with	   the	  event	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  –	  it	  has	  been	  adept	  at	  identifying	  physical	  locations	  for	  its	  PR	  events	  that	  lend	  it	  legitimacy	  and	  prestige.	  	  	  	  Attendance	   was	   by	   invitation	   only,	   and	   the	   audience	   included	   academics	  (including	  this	  author),	  various	  MPs	  from	  the	  British	  parliament	  and	  other	  local	  dignitaries.	  The	  event	  began	  with	  a	  smart,	  non-­‐alcoholic	  drinks	  reception,	  hosted	  by	   various	   members	   of	   the	   DS.	   Professional	   photographers	   captured	  conversations	  on	  camera	  for	  later	  dissemination	  on	  the	  DS	  website.	  The	  showing	  of	  the	  film	  itself	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  question-­‐and-­‐answer	  session	  with	  its	  director.	  	  	  	  
Love	   is	   a	   Verb	   is	   a	   glossy	   and	   well-­‐researched	   production,	   featuring	   some	  fascinating	  video	  and	  photographic	   footage	  of	  Fethullah	  Gülen’s	  early	  career	  as	  an	  imam	  and	  public	  preacher	  in	  Turkey.	  It	  is	  obvious,	  however,	  that	  the	  film	  was	  made	   for	   a	   foreign	   audience	   that	   is	   largely	   unfamiliar	   with	   the	   intricacies	   of	  Turkish	  Islam	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  state,	  rather	  than	  a	  domestic	  one	  which	  would	  be	  accutely	  aware	  of	  those	  intricacies.	  Accordingly,	  the	  film’s	  narrative	  is	  extremely	   idealistic.	   It	   tells	  the	  story	  of	  an	  army	  of	  selfless	  volunteers,	   inspired	  by	  a	  Sufic	  interpretation	  of	  Islam	  and	  motivated	  by	  the	  altruistic	  requirements	  of	  their	   Muslim	   faith	   to	   bring	   education	   and	   healthcare	   to	   poor	   and	   war-­‐ridden	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Caroline	  Tee,	  “The	  Gülen	  Movement	  and	  the	  AK	  Party:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  a	  Turkish	  Islamist	  Alliance.”	  In	  Yavuz	  and	  Balcı,	  op.	  cit.	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societies	   such	   as	   Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	   Somalia	   and	   Iraq.	   There	   are	   some	   very	  veiled	   references	   to	   the	   political	   situation	   in	  Turkey,	   the	   tensions	   surrounding	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  public	  life,	  and	  indeed	  to	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  the	  amount	  of	  power	  and	  influence	  that	  is	  yielded	  by	  Gülen	  and	  his	  followers	  there,	  but	   these	   issues	   are	   not	   explored	   in	   any	   depth.	  When	   asked	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  screening	  whether	  there	  were	  any	  plans	  to	  show	  the	  film	  in	  Turkey,	  the	  DS	  host	  responded	   in	   the	   negative,	   indicating	   that	   the	   film	   had	   been	   made	   for	   an	  international	   audience	   and	   that	   the	   information	   contained	   within	   it	   would	  already	  be	  ‘obvious’	  to	  many	  Turkish	  viewers.	  	  In	   fact,	  any	  Turkish	  viewer	  of	  Love	  is	  a	  Verb	  would	  recognise	  that	  the	  narrative	  being	  told	  of	   the	  GM	  was	  entirely	  one-­‐sided.	  The	   image	  of	   the	  GM	  that	   the	   film	  presented	  was	  of	  an	  apolitical	  Muslim	  movement	  characterised	  by	  charity,	  hard	  work	   and	   heroic	   self-­‐sacrifice.	   Certainly,	   these	   are	   important	   aspects	   of	   the	  movement,	   and	   it	   is	   true	   that	   Gülen’s	   collection	   of	   dedicated	   followers	   have	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  his	  success	  through	  their	  extraordinary	  commitment	  and	  work	  ethic.	  However,	   the	  GM	   is	  surely	  more	  complex	  –	  and	  certainly	  wealthier	  and	  more	  powerful	  –	  than	  the	  film’s	  one-­‐dimensional	  narrative	  seems	  to	  suggest.	  To	  the	  audience	  in	  London,	  however,	  who	  made	  various	  expressions	  of	  support	  for	  the	  film	  in	  the	  Q&A	  session,	  the	  narrative	  was	  apparently	  compelling.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  vein	  to	  the	  materials	  produced	  by	  Quilliam,	  Love	  is	  a	  Verb	  fed	  directly	  into	  the	  narrative	  of	   ‘moderate	  Islam’	  that	  has	  gained	  such	  currency	  since	  9/11	  and	  7/7.	  The	  film	  is	  highly	  idealised	  and	  selective	  in	  its	  account	  of	  the	  GM,	  and	  of	  its	   representation	  of	   Islam.	  As	  Mamdani	  has	   shown,	   the	  weakness	  of	   the	   ‘good	  Muslim’/’bad	   Muslim’	   paradigm	   lies	   partly	   in	   its	   inability	   to	   view	   Muslims	   as	  individuals	   with	   full	   human	   agency.	   Rather,	   it	   posits	   Islam	   as	   a	   static	   and	  monolithic	   category	  with	   the	   capacity	   for	   action	   in	   its	   own	   right.	   In	   reality,	   as	  anthropologists	  of	  Islam	  have	  recognised,	  it	  is	  more	  accurate	  to	  admit	  that	  Islam	  exists	  primarily	   in	   the	   lives,	  practices	  and	  beliefs	  of	  Muslims,	  rather	   than	  as	  an	  immutable	  or	  ahistorical	  essence.	  Islam	  is	  therefore	  subject	  to	  considerable	  local	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and	   regional	   variation,	   of	   change	   over	   time	   and,	   on	   occasion,	   of	   internal	  contradiction.34	  	  	  The	   point	   I	   wish	   to	   make	   here	   is	   not	   that	   the	   GM’s	   documentary	   film	   is	   a	  wholesale	  distortion	  of	  the	  truth,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  deliberately	  intended	  to	  mislead	  its	  British	  audience.	  Rather,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  that,	  because	  of	  the	  keen	  appetite	  for	  evidence	  of	  ‘moderate’	  Islam	  and	  its	  enactment	  in	  Britain	  today,	  the	  movement’s	  self	   representation	   in	  Love	  is	  a	  Verb	  was	  subject	   to	   less	  critical	   scrutiny	   than	   it	  could	   or	   should	   have	   been.	   In	   consuming	   the	   narrative	   of	   ‘good	   Islam’,	   the	  audience	   of	  Love	   is	  a	  Verb	   was	   encouraged	   to	   overlook	   the	   historical,	   political	  and	   cultural	   factors	   that	   have	   shaped	   the	   genesis	   and	   emergence	   of	   the	  GM	   in	  20th	  century	  Turkey.	  Therefore,	  what	  was	  on	  show	  was	  an	  idealised	  depiction	  of	  an	   essentialised	   religious	   tradition,	   rather	   than	   contextualised	   stories	   of	  individual	  human	  agents	  with	  conflicting	  loyalties	  and	  complex	  motivations.	  	  	  
DEFENDING	  GÜLEN	  IN	  THE	  POST-­‐COUP	  ERA	  In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   corruption	   scandal	   that	   broke	   in	   December	   2013,	   it	  became	   clear	   that	   relations	  between	   the	  GM	  and	   the	  AK	  Party	  had	   irreparably	  broken	  down.	  The	  movement	  had	  apparently	  been	  intent	  on	  fatally	  damaging	  the	  democratically	   elected	   government	   through	   subversive	   use	   of	   wiretapping	   on	  ministerial	  telephones.	  In	  2013,	  however,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  attracted	  relatively	  little	   interest	   outside	   Turkey	   and	   the	   GM’s	   global	   image	   remained	   largely	  untarnished	   by	   its	   questionable	   political	   machinations	   at	   home.	   As	   of	   15	   July	  2016,	  however,	  the	  picture	  is	  very	  different.	  The	  war	  between	  the	  GM	  and	  the	  AK	  Party	  has	  made	  headline	  news	  around	   the	  world,	   and	   the	  movement	  has	   since	  been	  under	  considerable	  pressure	  to	  defend	  itself	  against	  allegations	  of	  serious	  crimes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Talal	  Asad,	  “The	  Idea	  of	  an	  Anthropology	  of	  Islam.”	  Occasional	  Papers	  Series,	  
Center	  for	  Contemporary	  Arab	  Studies,	  Georgetown	  University,	  1986.	  See	  also	  Abdul	  Hamid	  El-­‐Zein,	  “Between	  Ideology	  and	  Theology:	  A	  Search	  for	  the	  Anthropology	  of	  Islam.”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology	  6	  (1977):	  227–54.	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The	  violence	  and	  audacity	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  July	  15	  came	  as	  a	  profound	  shock	  to	  Turkish	  citizens	  and	  international	  observers	  of	  Turkey	  alike,	  and	  even	  those	  who	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  complexities	  of	   the	  GM’s	  relationship	  to	  political	  power,	  and	  the	   escalating	   crisis	   in	   its	   relationship	  with	   the	   governing	   AK	   Party,	   were	   not	  expecting	   it	   to	  mount	   a	   sudden	  and	  violent	  military	   assault	   on	   civilian	   targets.	  Therefore,	  to	  the	  international	  audience	  who	  had	  consumed	  an	  insider	  narrative	  about	   Gülen	   and	   his	   followers	   before	   July	   2016,	   the	   accusations	   against	   him	  understandably	  appeared	  outlandish	  and	  preposterous.35	  	  	  	  In	  the	  USA,	  the	  movement	  has	  capitalised	  on	  the	  cohort	  of	  influential	  supporters	  who	  have	  been	  willing	  to	  speak	  out	   in	   its	  defence.	  These	  voices	  have	  become	  a	  significant	   part	   of	   the	   GM’s	   strategy	   in	   the	   post-­‐coup	   era,	   and	   a	   potentially	  powerful	   counter-­‐challenge	   to	   President	   Erdoğan’s	   demands	   for	   Gülen’s	  extradition.	   A	   prominent	   example	   from	   the	  US	   context	   is	   an	   article	  written	   by	  Mark	  Juergensmeyer,	  an	  eminent	  professor	  of	  religious	  studies	  and	  sociology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California,	  in	  January	  2017.36	  The	  article	  is	  based	  on	  a	  meeting	  the	  author	  had	  with	  Gülen	  at	  his	  Pennsylvania	  home.	  In	  it,	   Juergensmeyer	  talks	  about	   the	  movement	  as	   the	  victim	  of	  persecution	   from	  the	  Turkish	  authorities,	  and	   draws	   a	   hyperbolic	   parallel	   between	   Gülen	   and	   the	   Dalai	   Lama.	  While	   he	  admits	   he	   has	   no	   way	   of	   accurately	   assessing	   the	   charges	   facing	   the	   GM,	   the	  author	   declares	   that,	   ‘considering	   his	   relative	   isolation	   in	   his	   woodsy	   retreat	  with	  little	  or	  no	  apparent	  organizational	  structure	  around	  him,	  it	  seems	  hard	  to	  imagine	  him	  plotting	  an	   intricate	  coup	  attempt	  on	   the	  other	  side	  of	   the	  world.’	  Such	  a	  statement	  evidences	  the	  serious	  gap	  in	  Juergensmeyer’s	  judgement,	  as	  –	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  were	  used	  for	  nefarious	  ends	  on	  the	  night	   in	  question	   –	   it	   is	   commonly	   recognised	   that	   the	   GM	   commands	   considerable	  resources	  all	  around	  the	  world,	  and	  maintains	  tightknit	  transnational	  networks	  that	   extend	   Gülen’s	   power	   and	   influence	   well	   beyond	   his	   compound	   in	  Pennsylvania.	  What	   the	   intervention	  by	   Juergensmeyer,	  who	   is	   not	   a	   specialist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  The	  international	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  was	  largely	  dominated	  by	  criticism	  of	  Erdoğan’s	  heavy-­‐handed	  response,	  and	  was	  somewhat	  slow	  to	  condemn	  the	  coup	  plotters.	  This	  led	  to	  serious	  frustration	  amongst	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  domestic	  audience.	  	  36	  Juergensmeyer,	  op.	  cit.	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on	  Turkey,	   shows	  very	  powerfully	   is	   that	   the	  GM’s	   longstanding	   investment	   in	  strategic	   PR	   can	   now	   potentially	   pay	   dividends	   as	   its	   battle	   with	   the	   Turkish	  authorities	  plays	  itself	  out	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  	  	  The	   debate	   surrounding	   Gülen’s	   extradition	   is	   understandably	   taking	   place	  primarily	   in	   the	  USA,	  where	   he	   is	   resident.	   There	   have	  been	  no	  media	   articles	  along	   the	   lines	   of	   Juergensmeyer’s	   by	   British	   academics	   or	   public	   figures.37	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  UK	  discussions	  surrounding	  the	  allegations	  have	  been	  rather	  more	  nuanced,	   and	   there	   is	   a	  degree	  of	   scepticism	   in	  political	   circles	  about	   the	  GM’s	  protestations	  of	  innocence.	  In	  December	  2016,	  the	  movement	  was	  invited	  to	  give	  evidence	  at	  the	  Houses	  of	  Parliament	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  failed	  coup,	  as	  part	  of	  a	   Foreign	   Affairs	   Committee	   report	   on	   the	   UK’s	   relations	   with	   Turkey.	   It	   was	  represented	  by	  the	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  DS,	  Özcan	  Keleş,	  as	  well	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  members	  of	   the	  movement,	  Yüksel	  Alp	  Aslandoğan,	  who	   is	  based	   in	   the	  USA	  and	  on	  occasion	  acts	  as	  Gülen’s	  spokesperson.38	  As	  the	  institution	  chosen	  to	  represent	   the	   GM,	   the	  DS	   evidenced	   its	   ability	   to	   engage	   comfortably	  with	   the	  legislative	  processes	  of	  British	  politics:	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  Keleş	  and	  Aslandoğan	   were	   confident,	   articulate	   and	   well	   rehearsed.	   However,	   the	  committee’s	  report	  found	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  GM’s	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  coup	  was	  inconclusive,	  and	  it	  noted	  that,	  “the	  explanations	  provided	  to	  us	  by	  the	  Gülenists	  did	  not	  resolve	  our	  uncertainties	  about	   the	   fundamental	  nature	  and	  motives	  of	  their	  movement”.39	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  Publications	  in	  the	  academic	  style	  that	  clearly	  support	  Gülen	  are,	  however,	  still	  going	  to	  press	  in	  the	  UK.	  In	  2017	  Bloomsbury	  Academic	  published	  Simon	  Robinson’s	  The	  Spirituality	  of	  Responsibility,	  in	  which	  the	  author	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  was	  written	  with	  guidance	  from	  members	  of	  the	  DS	  and	  almost	  entirely	  ignores	  the	  current	  scandal	  surrounding	  Gülen.	  	  38	  The	  oral	  evidence	  that	  they	  gave	  can	  be	  viewed	  online	  at	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xi9vwD8-­‐mRo	  (accessed	  16	  November	  2017).	  Written	  evidence	  can	  be	  found	  at	  http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-­‐affairs-­‐committee/uks-­‐relations-­‐with-­‐turkey/written/42795.pdf	  (accessed	  16	  November	  2017).	  39	  “The	  UK’s	  Relations	  with	  Turkey”	  House	  of	  Commons	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee,	  25	  March	  2017,	  p.36.	  	  https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/615/615.pdf	  (accessed	  17	  November	  2017).	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  Nevertheless,	   the	   movement	   has	   continued	   to	   pursue	   the	   same	   strategic	  audience	   for	   public	   relations	   activities	   since	   the	   coup,	   and	   still	   commands	   a	  faithful	   support	   base.	   It	   has	   drawn	   on	   its	   earlier	   strategy	   of	   utilising	   physical	  sites	   that	   are	   inscribed	   with	   legitimacy,	   and	   has	   recently	   started	   holding	  invitation-­‐only	   lunchtime	  meetings	   in	   a	   location	   on	  Whitehall,	   less	   than	   half	   a	  mile	  from	  Downing	  Street	  and	  the	  British	  seat	  of	  government	  at	  Westminster.	  At	  one	  such	  meeting	  that	  this	  author	  attended	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2017,	  the	  subject	  of	  discussion	   was	   the	   coup	   and	   its	   aftermath,	   and	   the	   invited	   guests	   comprised	  other	  academics	  as	  well	  as	  a	  faith	  leader	  from	  the	  Christian	  Church	  and	  various	  local	  civic	  leaders.	  A	  presentation	  was	  made	  by	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  DS,	  which	  laid	   out	   very	   comprehensively	   the	   GM’s	   legal	   defence	   in	   light	   of	   the	   coup	  allegations.	   The	   reception	   of	   this	   presentation	  was	   broadly	   positive,	   and	   there	  were	  no	  vocal	  detractors	  amongst	  the	  invited	  guests.	  	  	  The	  event	  replicated	  many	  of	   the	   features	  of	   the	  movement’s	  PR	  activities	   that	  existed	   before	   the	   coup:	   it	   consisted	   of	   a	   select	   group	   of	   strategic	   invitees;	   it	  foregrounded	   an	   insider	   perspective	   on	   the	   GM;	   and	   it	   was	   held	   in	   a	   highly	  symbolic	   location.	  Like	   the	  conference	   launch	  event	  at	   the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  and	  the	   film	   premiere	   in	   Leicester	   Square,	   the	   roundtable	   lunch	   meeting	   on	  Whitehall	   took	   on	   an	   extra	   dimension	   because	   of	   the	   potent	   symbolism	  of	   the	  physical	  space	  that	  it	  occupied.	  The	  event	  was,	  however,	  limited	  to	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  attendees,	  and	  was	  therefore	  more	  limited	  in	  scope	  than	  the	  larger	  events	  of	  the	  pre-­‐coup	  era	  that	  were	  narrated	  above.	  The	  observation	  is	  tentative,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  seizure	  of	  many	  material	  assets	  belonging	  to	  the	  GM	  in	  Turkey	  since	  July	  2016	  is	  limiting	  the	  resources	  available	  to	  its	  global	  franchises.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  movement’s	  PR	  activities	  in	  the	  near	  future	  will	  be	  less	  lavishly	  funded	  than	  they	  were	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  Lastly,	   the	  GM	  has	   increased	  the	   levels	  of	   transparency	  surrounding	   its	  various	  activities.	   In	  2017	   it	  established	   the	  Sohbet	  Society,	  which	  describes	   itself	  as	   ‘a	  non-­‐profit	   organisation	   providing	   religious	   learning	   and	   spiritual	   activities	   for	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Muslims’,40	  and	   offers	   regular	   reading	   groups	   and	   mentoring	   amongst	   other	  services.	   GM	   sohbet	   groups	   (discussion	   groups	   focusing	   on	   the	   Qur’an	   and	   its	  interpretation,	  and	  the	  works	  of	  Gülen)	  have	  not	  previously	  been	  open	  to	  general	  Muslim	   publics	   in	   this	   way,	   but	   rather	   have	   been	   operated	   by	   informal	  invitations	   to	   participate	  within	   closed	   GM	   networks.41	  The	   decision	   to	   openly	  advertise	  sohbet	   groups	   through	  digital	  media	  represents	  a	  new	  move	   towards	  greater	   transparency	   for	   the	   movement,	   and	   is	   part	   of	   its	   response	   to	   the	  allegations	  that	  it	  harbours	  hidden	  agendas.	  It	  remains	  unclear	  what	  level	  of	  take	  up	  these	  groups	  have	  had	  over	  the	  past	  months,	  and	  whether	  the	  move	  towards	  online	  accessibility	  to	  all	  will	  alter	  the	  demographic	  of	  GM	  sohbet	  groups,	  which	  have	  always	  been	  almost	  exclusively	  Turkish	  in	  composition.	  	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  As	   the	   movement	   faces	   a	   new	   and	   uncertain	   future	   in	   the	   post-­‐coup	   era,	   the	  credibility	   it	  has	  built	  up	   in	  strategic	  circles	   in	   the	  West	  seem	   likely	   to	  serve	   it	  well.	   Its	  assets	  and	  activities	  in	  Turkey	  have	  been	  comprehensively	  dismantled,	  and	   it	   seems	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   the	   GM	   will	   be	   able	   to	   rebuild	   itself	   in	   its	  homeland.	   In	   addition,	   its	   international	   schools	   are	   also	   under	   threat,	   and	  numerous	   countries	   have	   already	   given	   way	   to	   pressure	   from	   the	   Turkish	  government	   to	   either	   close	   them	   or	   transfer	   their	   ownership	   elsewhere.	  Thousands	  of	  Gülen’s	  close	  followers	  are	  now	  being	  detained	  in	  Turkey	  or	  living	  in	   exile	   abroad	   and,	   with	   his	   extradition	   still	   being	   actively	   pursued,	   their	  leader’s	   own	   fate	   hangs	   in	   the	   balance.	   Yet	   because	   of	   nearly	   two	   decades	   of	  investment	  in	  strategic	  engagement	  in	  Western	  nations	  such	  as	  the	  UK,	  the	  GM	  is	  well	  positioned	  today	  to	  take	  its	  fight	  with	  President	  Erdoğan	  to	  the	  public	  arena	  of	  international	  discourse,	  where	  in	  some	  quarters	  it	  holds	  valuable	  sway.	  As	  the	  Juergensmeyer	   article	   powerfully	   illustrates,	   the	   movement	   can	   draw	   on	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  http://www.sohbetsociety.org/about-­‐us	  (accessed	  10	  November	  2017).	  41	  Smita	  Tewari	  Jassal,	  “The	  Sohbet:	  Talking	  Islam	  in	  Turkey.”	  Sociology	  of	  Islam	  1,	  no.	  3–4	  (2014):	  188–208.	  See	  also	  Fabio	  Vicini,	  “Pedagogies	  of	  Affection:	  The	  Role	  of	  Exemplariness	  and	  Emulation	  in	  Learning	  Processes	  -­‐	  Extracurricular	  Islamic	  Education	  in	  the	  Fethullah	  Gülen	  Community	  in	  Istanbul.”	  Anthropology	  
and	  Education	  Quarterly	  44,	  no.	  4	  (2013):	  381–98.	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influential	   audience	   for	   high-­‐profile	   endorsement.	   Notwithstanding	   the	  ambivalence	  of	   the	  2016	  House	  of	  Commons	   report	   on	   the	   coup,	   this	   strategic	  support	  base	  may	  yet	  prove	  to	  be	  the	  GM’s	  most	  valuable	  asset	  over	  the	  coming	  months	  and	  years.	  	  For	   as	   long	   as	   Western	   audiences	   consume	   the	   artificial	   and	   dichotomous	  narrative	  of	   ‘good	  Muslim’	  versus	   ‘bad	  Muslim’,	  which	  has	  gained	  considerable	  traction	  in	  the	  post-­‐9/11	  world,	  such	  support	  for	  the	  GM	  seems	  likely	  to	  endure.	  This	  narrative	  has	  failed	  us	  on	  many	  levels,	  not	  least	  by	  failing	  to	  recognise	  the	  location	  of	  Islamic	  ideologies	  and	  activities	  within	  particular	  social,	  political	  and	  temporal	   contexts.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   GM,	   this	   narrative	   has	   obscured	  understanding	  of	  its	  historical	  origins	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  secularism	  and	  state	  power	   in	   Turkey.	   In	   the	   post-­‐coup	   era,	   it	   has	   created	   confusion	   about	   its	  intentions	  and	  capabilities.	  It	  is	  therefore	  to	  be	  hoped	  that	  future	  analyses	  of	  the	  movement	  will	  move	  away	  from	  this	  dichotomous	  approach,	  and	  will	  study	  it	  as	  the	   complex	   and	  multifaceted	   product	   of	   its	   own	   culture,	   geography	   and	   time	  that	  it	  actually	  is.	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